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TOWARD JEFFERSONIAN GOVERNANCE OF
THE PUBLIC LANDS
Owen Olpin*
A story is going around about a recent Interior Department hearing
on proposed increases in public land grazing fees. A woman spoke out
for going beyond simply raising grazing fees and urged that cows be re-
moved from public lands entirely. Doing that, she said, would encourage
us to eat vegetables as our food and thereby better serve both human
health and the environment. The next speaker removed his cowboy hat
as he approached the microphone, and, correcting the previous speaker,
drawled, "Vegetables are not food; vegetables are what food eats."'
A sawmill spokesman told another story in which he recounted a
brainstorming session in preparation for a hearing on a draft forest plan.
"People came up with some neat ideas ... such as writing their com-
ments on two-by-fours and wheeling them in. They wanted to have some
fun." 2 The hearing was ultimately canceled by the forest supervisor who
became apprehensive about a "carnival atmosphere" and even possible
violence.'
Although public land hearings are not always so entertaining, these
two stories typify public participation in such hearings. The vegetarian,
the cowboy, the loggers, and the butcher, the baker, and the candlestick
maker, all get their platform, and after they have their say, land agency
officials retire to decide the issues at hand behind closed doors. Those
citizens who appear and speak at the hearings are not present at the final
decision point, and skeptics are entitled to wonder whether the hearing
testimony has any meaningful impact on the decision making.
This process encourages speakers at hearings to champion, with
equal fervor, their positions on all the issues that are up for decision.
* Partner, O'Melveny & Myers, Los Angeles. The Author of this Essay is particularly
indebted to Daniel Kemmis for his provocative and helpful little book COMMUNITY AND THE
POLITICS OF PLACE (1990). A Jeffersonian through and through, Mr. Kemmis points the way
to how citizens can work together to accommodate their differences, reinvigorate government,
and nurture their communities.
1. Former Interior Secretary Stewart Udall, Address at the Envirohmental Law Institute
Annual Awards Banquet (Oct. 20, 1993).
2. Katharine Collins, Explosive Atmosphere Snuffs out Hearing, HIGH COUNTRY NEWS,
Mar. 16, 1987, at 4.
3. Id.
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Speakers do not tell the agency which positions they hold passionately
and which positions they might be willing to compromise. Thus each
speaker maintains ideological purity, saying only things that will please
supporters or annoy adversaries.
Although the actors and the props may change, the scene at the
grazing hearing exemplifies much of what has passed for public participa-
tion in federal land agency decision making during the quarter century
that has passed since the enactment of the National Environmental Pol-
icy Act of 1969 (NEPA).4 The Bureau of Land Management, the Forest
Service, and the National Park Service, with varying degrees of effective-
ness, seek out concerned citizens and give them opportunities to make
their views known. But those agencies do not bring citizens together to
work out their differences through meaningful dialogue with each other.
Although Thomas Jefferson might have been amused by the theat-
rics, he surely would not have approved this mode of government. He
would, in fact, be appalled to hear such carnivals even characterized as
"public participation." In writing to Uriah Forrest from Paris in late
1787, he expressed deep concern about the absence of more direct citizen
roles in the Philadelphia draft constitution. He wrote that the goal
should be to "[e]ducate and inform the whole mass of the people, enable
them to see that it is their interest to preserve peace and order, and they
will preserve it .... They are the only sure reliance for the preservation
of our liberty."5 Informed citizens, to the author of our Declaration of
Independence, were the "most legitimate engine of government.",
6
Jefferson had no illusions that direct governance by the people
would be easy, but he was willing to have it even at the cost of periodic
rebellions and bloodshed.' Being so disposed, he would not have been
impressed by the forest supervisor's fear of violence, and he would have
denounced as meaningless a hearing at which citizens were merely ex-
pected to bray and then step back and accept a bureaucratic decision.
The thesis of this Essay is that a Jeffersonian approach to citizen
participation should replace the public participation techniques now em-
ployed by federal land management agencies. More specifically, land
agency officials should sponsor and participate in direct negotiations with
representatives of citizen groups having opposing stakes in important
4. Pub. L. No. 91-190, 83 Stat. 852 (1970) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 4321-
4370d (West 1985 & Supp. 1993)).
5. Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Uriah Forrest (Dec. 31, 1787), in 12 THE PAPERS OF





public land decisions. Below I set forth reasons why both citizens and
agency officials should be willing to experiment with such direct negotia-
tions, and offer answers to some of the arguments that have been and will
be raised against this approach.
At the outset we must acknowledge that citizens interested in public
land decisions will not be willing to negotiate unless negotiations offer
them some prospect of more acceptable outcomes. Citizens who are con-
fident that the agency will see the issues entirely their way surely will
prefer testifying in the usual manner and waiting for the good news. Citi-
zens unsure about the outcome, however, will have reason to consider
opportunities for give and take.
Even in the face of uncertainty about the outcome, however, there
are some basic questions to ask before venturing into negotiations:
1. Does the impending agency decision raise a mix of is-
sues of varying importance to opposing interest groups that af-
ford the groups and the agency opportunities to find a mutually
acceptable resolution?
2. Are knowledgeable and credible spokespersons for
various interests open to possible compromise and willing to
engage in good faith negotiations?
3. Finally, will the agency agree in some meaningful way
to honor any agreement that might be achieved through
negotiations?
In the case of the vegetarian and the cowboy at the grazing hearing,
the needed mix of issues available for compromise seems lacking. After
all, one who is dead set against eating cows and one who earns a living
raising cows to eat will have problems agreeing on public land grazing
policies. The same outcome could also be forecast whenever fundamen-
tal precepts are in opposition. The evolutionist and the creationist, for
example, are unlikely to succeed in negotiating the high school science
curriculum, and the pro-life and pro-choice camps will surely fail to
reach a compromise on a national abortion policy.
In most public land and resource settings, however, the lines will not
be drawn so neatly. In the grazing fee controversy there will, of course,
be ranchers concerned about grazing costs, but there will also be sport
fishers concerned about streams, conservationists concerned about wild-
life habitat, and perhaps different conservationists concerned about resto-
ration of overgrazed areas, and so on. It is possible that in a more
complex brew of interests there will be viable trade offs. Although no
interest group is likely to get everything it desires, each might hope to
reach a mutually acceptable resolution.
April 1994]
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For example, some groups might accept a smaller increase in graz-
ing fees, or a phasing in of a higher fee structure, if coupled with restric-
tions to protect environmentally sensitive or overgrazed areas. Sport
fishers might be willing to compromise if adequate protections are pro-
vided for trout streams. The agency itself might agree to smaller fee in-
creases as a quid pro quo for an agreement by grazing permit holders to
reclaim lands damaged by past overgrazing so that tax dollars will not
have to be spent to reclaim them.
Most important policy decisions on federal public land use and man-
agement do in fact involve multiple issues, and the black and white views
of the vegetarian and the cowboy present the unusual circumstance, not
the norm. Interested citizens will usually find that their diverse agendas
afford opportunities for creative problem solving. Assuming again that
interested citizens lack confidence that the agency will see all the critical
issues their way, each will have some incentive to participate directly in
the process of fashioning compromises instead of rolling the dice in the
hope the agency will make acceptable trade offs behind closed doors.
Turning to the second question, it is important that all significant
interests be represented in the negotiations by knowledgeable and credi-
ble spokespersons who are willing to negotiate in good faith. An agree-
ment struck in the absence of representatives of all legitimate interests
will likely be unacceptable to those interests not represented and should
be unacceptable to the agency as a matter of principle. Thus, the agency
must painstakingly seek out all those who are interested and then work
with those sharing common interests to select representatives to negotiate
for them.
The process of "convening" negotiations-identifying the interests
at stake and selecting negotiating representatives for differing points of
view-will require resourcefulness and diligence on the part of the
agency. It is unlikely, for example, that a single conservationist represen-
tative will have the confidence of all who might indiscriminately be la-
-belled conservationists. There will be those whose primary concern is
nature preservation, and they will likely have different agendas from
those concerned about recreational pursuits or those concerned about
cultural and historical values. Similarly, the varied commercial and
commodity interests will not always be of a single mind on the issues at
hand. Yet others will have more theoretical concerns such as market
distortions from grazing fees on public lands that are lower than those on
private lands. All these groups will need representatives who are knowl-
edgeable and trusted by those for whom they speak.
[Vol. 27:959
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Having identified those who should participate, it is essential to have
a commitment from all participants to negotiate in good faith in quest of
solutions that all can accept. If there are important interest groups with
legitimate stakes in the outcome who will not agree to negotiate in this
manner, then the negotiating process probably should not be attempted.
The agency, therefore, should exert great effort in the convening stage to
encourage citizens to see the potential benefits that can come from Jeffer-
sonian citizens working together to resolve their differences.
Addressing the third and final question, the struggle to achieve a
compromise can be worthwhile only if the participants are assured by the
agency that their efforts will be meaningful. This raises the issue of ex-
actly what the agency can offer consistent with its duties under the law.
This is not an easy question because congressional charters rarely, if ever,
allow agencies to delegate decision-making authority.
Although the land agencies must retain ultimate decision-making
power, Congress has explicitly recognized the merits of negotiations
among interest groups in the drafting of agency regulations in compara-
ble circumstances. In the Negotiated Rulemaking Act of 1990,8 Con-
gress authorized and encouraged regulatory agencies to engage in
negotiated rule making very much like the Jeffersonian decision-making
mode advocated here. The law was passed after the Administrative Con-
ference of the United States (ACUS) and the Environmental Protection
Agency (EPA) and several other federal agencies achieved noteworthy
successes in negotiating regulations.9
The EPA pattern is instructive. Interest group and EPA representa-
tives negotiate proposed rules, which the EPA promises it will publish in
the Federal Register for public comment. Although the EPA retains, as
it must, the power to adopt the final rule, it nonetheless makes the negoti-
ations meaningful by proffering the negotiated compromise for what it
is-the product of trade offs negotiated in good faith by agency repre-
sentatives and representatives of interest groups with varying and oppos-
ing stakes in the outcome.
8. 5 U.S.C. §§ 561-570 (Supp. IV 1992).
9. See generally DAVID M. PRITZKER & DEBORAH S. DALTON, ADMINISTRATIVE CON-
FERENCE OF THE U.S., NEGOTIATED RULEMAKING SOURCEBOOK (1990). David Pritzker, an
attorney for the Administrative Conference and a leading thinker on negotiated rule making
since the early 1980s, played the primary role in the publication of this highly useful
sourcebook. The Thomas Jefferson of negotiated rule making is Philip Harter of Washington,
D.C., who has written and lectured widely on the subject. His seminal paper supported the
early recommendations of the Administrative Conference, which are reprinted in the
Sourcebook. See Philip 3. Hater, Negotiating Regulations: A Cure for Malaise, 71 GEO. L.J. 1
(1982).
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Similarly, the federal land management agencies can offer com-
promises forged through negotiations as proposed forest plans or grazing
fee solutions and publish them as such in the Federal Register. If the
EPA experience holds true, the public comment process will often be
quite tepid and do little more than endorse the accommodations reached
through negotiations. When the requisite care has been taken in conven-
ing and conducting negotiations, concerned citizens and groups will ordi-
narily have been consulted and will already have concurred in the
compromise.
Thus, the fact that the land management agency retains final deci-
sion-making power will not make the negotiated compromise unimpor-
tant. Because agency representatives participated in the negotiations, the
agency is likely to give deference to the negotiated agreement.
If the interest group participation questions are answered satisfacto-
rily, the additional questions the agency must examine can be reduced to
just two. The first deals with logistics and the second with fundamental
principle:
1. Does the agency have the resources needed to sponsor
and carry out negotiations?
2. Is there a reasonable prospect that negotiated com-
promises will provide better short- and long-range solutions
than those reached via the presently used notice-and-comment
mode?
The first question is important but not complex. It is a near cer-
tainty that the resources required to reach a negotiated solution will ex-
ceed those required for the agency simply to follow the traditional public
participation mode. Several resource-intensive steps must be added to
effect a Jeffersonian administrative process.
As noted previously, an agency must expend considerable effort in
assuring that all interests are identified and that knowledgeable and cred-
ible representatives are found to speak for them. In the case of diffuse
citizen groups who lack significant economic stakes in the outcome, the
agency may be required to provide funding to locate group representa-
tives and enable them to devote the time and effort that will be needed.
There will also be educational roles that the agency must play to
achieve Jefferson's ideal of governance by sufficiently informed citizens.
Some and perhaps most of the interest group representatives may need
help on relevant technical and scientific information. 10 On an even more
10. As a general proposition, public lands decisions will involve less scientific and techni-
cal complexity than regulatory decisions of the EPA. Citizen understanding of the basics of
[Vol. 27:959
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elementary level, some representatives may need some very basic training
in the art of negotiation: The qualities and experiences that make people
suitable interest group representatives may not always equip them for
negotiation.
Finally, in most cases there will be a need to retain a qualified per-
son to serve as a neutral facilitator or mediator. The experience of the
EPA in negotiated rule making demonstrates the benefits that come from
having a skilled professional help articulate the issues and guide the rep-
resentatives in working toward compromises.
As all of these practical requirements must be met, a land agency
should not launch a negotiating process unless it knows the needed re-
sources are available. If the required resources are in fact available, the
remaining question is whether negotiations promise better public lands
decision making. Land agency officials should not be expected to spon-
sor negotiations unless there is at least a reasonable prospect that better
public land and resource policies will result in both the short and the
long term.
Some will argue that only the agency should make land-use deci-
sions because only the agency has the expertise and information required
for such decision making. Even more, fundamentally, some will argue
that the agency has the sole duty to decide, and that it abdicates this duty
when it stoops to bartering with interest group representatives. Neither
of these arguments is ultimately persuasive.
Turning to the first argument, the agency's expertise and informa-
tion can and should be made available to participants in negotiations.
Indeed, consistent with Jefferson's letter to Forrest, one of the primary
agency responsibilities should be to educate and inform citizens so that
they can become effective engines of government. Throughout the course
of negotiations, the agency should be attentive to the scientific and tech-
nical needs of the negotiators, and should provide instruction and materi-
als to bring them to a level of understanding that will enable them to
participate effectively.
It is even possible that the negotiating process will bring to bear
more and better technical information than the agency alone can provide.
The interest groups themselves will often have useful information, and
forest planning, grazing, et cetera, is less often laden with the scientific imponderables involved
in framing proposed regulations dealing with, for example, asbestos risks or air pollution
abatement. Nonetheless, the Negotiated Rulemaking Sourcebook provides evidence that the
EPA has been generally successful in helping citizen negotiators deal with the scientific and
technical dimensions of their tasks. See PRITZKER & DALTON, supra note 9, at 235-36, 330-
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they will have every incentive to present that which adds to their credi-
bility. Subjecting such information to comparison and evaluation
through an interactive process will discourage the offering of questioia-
ble or insupportable information. Thus, it is possible that the total avail-
able information would be more useful than that which the agency has
accumulated and that which citizens now indiscriminately proffer in no-
tice-and-comment proceedings. And, all else being equal, that better in-
formation should tend to bring about better decisions.
Some will contend, however, that regardless of any other considera-
tions, the agencies alone have stewardship of public lands and that with
the stewardship responsibility comes the sole duty to decide. In that
strict view, an agency abdicates its responsibilities if it entrusts any part
of its decision-making authority to partisan interest group
representatives.
A respected scholar has argued that it is unseemly for an agency to
"bargain and trade its 'interests' (the public interest) in the same way the
other participants may trade their interests."'" The underlying assump-
tion, of course, is that the public interest is something distinguishable and
apart from the interests advanced by other interest groups. What makes
up this separate, platonic "public interest" that the agency alone seem-
ingly must define and safeguard remains unexplained. But if the conven-
ing of negotiations has achieved the objective of bringing together
representatives of all legitimate interests and if those representatives and
agency representatives work out an acceptable compromise, is it not
plausible that the compromise is in the public interest for the very reason
that it has been found acceptable to affected citizens? Indeed, of what
does the public interest consist if it is not some amalgam of citizen
interests?
At bottom, our nay-saying scholar simply does not trust the conven-
ing process because he doubts that it is possible to achieve adequate rep-
resentation for "all affected interests."' 2  Specifically, he worries about
the inability to secure representation of interests "not well defined, or-
ganized, or strong."' 3 He fears that "the agency's responsibility for de-
termining the public interest" would "no longer provide[ ] the safeguard
otherwise available for unrepresented interests.'
4
11. William Funk, When Smoke Gets in Your Eyes: Regulatory Negotiation and the Public
Interest-EPA's Woodstove Standards, 18 ENVTL. L. 55, 93 (1987). This article is a superb
piece of scholarship and no less so merely because I disagree with the author about regulatory
negotiation.





The agency, however, has at least two ways that it can deal with this
problem. First, the agency can be creative in seeking out spokespersons
who have the vision and conscience to speak effectively even for those
interests that are ill-defined, unorganized, or weak. Surely the agency
can ordinarily find able and dedicated citizens who would strive mightily
for interests that are worth protecting even though they may be ill-de-
fined, unorganized, or weak.
The second way the agency can deal with the problem is the very
way that our scholar would have the public interest safeguarded in tradi-
tional agency decision making. There is nothing in the negotiating
calculus that bars the agency's representative from speaking up for inter-
ests that it perceives may have fallen through the cracks. Thus, our
scholar is entirely correct that the agency should speak for such interests
and is wrong only in contending that the agency must eschew the negoti-
ating process to do so.
Although our scholar voices a number of thoughtful concerns call-
ing for persuasive answers, he raises one concern that merits only sum-
mary rejection. He asserts that to repose power in citizen negotiators is
to license a disregard of the law: "The law no longer directs or even
necessarily constrains the outcome but has become merely a factor in the
give-and-take necessary to achieve consensus."' 5
It is unworthy to suggest that agencies will be cavalier about con-
gressional mandates. Indeed, we should expect that an agency's repre-
sentatives will as a matter of course take the responsibility to caution
other participants on the legal bounds that confine negotiated solutions.
In the unlikely event that rogue agency representatives were to play fast
and loose with the law, a check exists in the efforts of agency superiors
and the self-interest or consciences of other participants.
Although it is far-fetched to assume that an agency will intention-
ally disregard its legal duties, it is not a far reach to worry about whether
an agency will make the best and fairest public land decisions within the
ambit of its statutory powers. The arguments against negotiated com-
promises simply assume that by acting alone the agency will arrive at
better decisions than those negotiated by the agency and interest group
representatives.
It would be easier to accept leaving sole governance of public lands
to the agencies if we were unencumbered by the past performances of
those agencies. The public land agencies have shown themselves -unusu-
ally susceptible to being "captured" by those interests they are charged
15. Id. at 94.
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to regulate or at least keep at arms length. Sometimes, in addition to
becoming highly partisan, agencies have punished employees who ques-
tion the agency's allegiance to favored commodity and commercial inter-
ests at the expense of the broader public interest.
1 6
If the land agencies do in fact take sides, is it naive to expect them to
experiment with more meaningful modes of public participation? Why,
one might ask, would agency leaders adopt reforms that lessen their abil-
ity to control the final outcome for the benefit of the interests they like
most? Those who take a jaundiced view of such matters can find ample
reasons to be skeptical.
Such cause for hope as exists may be grounded in the very inadequa-
cies of the public participation game as it is presently played. The mean-
inglessness of the carnival hearings of the past may contain the seeds of
hope for a better future. All that is required is a sharing of Jefferson's
vision of the worth of informed and functional citizens, and we ought to
be able to expect at least that level of altruism in public land agencies.
16. The Forest Service has not at all times been the Forest Service of Teddy Roosevelt and
Gifford Pinchot. Recently the publisher of High Country News, a highly respected biweekly
environmental newspaper, wrote a piece headlined "It's Time to Clearcut the Forest Service."
After recounting a succession of misdeeds blatantly favoring commodity and commercial in-
terests, the publisher concluded:
The Forest Service is beyond redemption, and should be abolished. It would not
be a huge loss. There is little institutional or human memory in the agency, given the
frequency with which employees are transferred, given how the agency has isolated
itself from the ground and from communities, and given its contempt for science.
The rule of life is "adapt or die." The Forest Service has failed to adapt. There-
fore it must die.
Ed Marston, It's Time to Clearcut the Forest Service, HIGH COUNTRY NEWS, Sept. 20, 1993,
at 13.
[Vol. 27:959
